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The Prohibition against Torture: Why the UK
Government is Falling Short and the Risks that
Remain
RUTH BLAKELEY AND SAM RAPHAEL
Abstract
While the UK’s ofﬁcial position is that it neither uses nor condones torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment (CIDT), it is now a matter of public and parliamentary record that
UK security services and military personnel colluded in rendition, torture, and cruel, inhu-
man and degrading treatment, both as part of the CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interroga-
tion (RDI) programme, at military detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through
involvement in the detention and interrogation of prisoners by allied security forces. This
paper will explain why the government is falling short of its obligations under international
law, and why considerable risks remain that UK intelligence and security services will con-
tinue to collude in torture and CIDT.
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Introduction
FOLLOWING the extreme brutality of World
War II, the international community commit-
ted itself to ensuring an absolute prohibition
on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment (CIDT). Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration (UDHR) states: ‘No
one shall be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’. Article 8 of the UDHR establishes the
right to an effective remedy when another
right has been violated. This protection is
also contained in binding human rights trea-
ties ratiﬁed by the UK, including the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Article 2:3). The prohibition against torture
and CIDT was a directive as well as a uni-
versal aspiration (no one shall be subjected).
There have been various initiatives following
the UDHR that reinforce both the normative
commitment and the legal obligation not to
torture or commit CIDT, the most prominent
of which are the Convention Against Tor-
ture, and in the context of the UK, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.
However, the reality on the ground is that
torture and CIDT are regularly perpetrated
by states. There have been widespread fail-
ings to give effect to Article 5, including in
the case of the UK.
While the UK’s ofﬁcial position is that it
neither uses nor condones torture or cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT),
credible evidence shows otherwise. It is now
a matter of public and parliamentary record
that UK security services and military per-
sonnel colluded in rendition, torture, and
CIDT, both as part of the CIA’s rendition,
detention and interrogation (RDI) pro-
gramme, and at military detention facilities
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The UK parliament’s Intelligence and
Security Committee (ISC) published two
reports following its investigation into detai-
nee mistreatment and rendition in June
2018.1 The investigation, chaired by MP and
QC Dominic Grieve, has revealed that the
UK’s role in prisoner abuse was even more
extensive than academic research had previ-
ously found.2 Yet ofﬁcials have been slow to
investigate fully, reticent about holding any-
one to account, and have done very little to
offer meaningful redress.
This article will outline the evidence
that has recently emerged showing the UK
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government’s use of torture and CIDT. It
will also explain why considerable risks
remain that UK intelligence and security ser-
vices will continue to collude in torture and
CIDT. There are several reasons why such
risks remain. First, while numerous members
of parliament and of the Intelligence and
Security Committee (ISC) take these matters
seriously, successive governments have been
unwilling to come clean about the full extent
of British collusion. Second, when the gov-
ernment has eventually acquiesced to calls to
investigate, it has placed considerable con-
straints on what can be investigated and
who can give evidence. It has also resisted
calls for due process against individuals
where evidence emerges that they were com-
plicit in torture.
Third, UK government policy on torture
and CIDT has failed to uphold the absolute
prohibition in all circumstances, resulting in
a lack of rigour in the guidance and training
provided to UK personnel. Finally, the gov-
ernment has refused to offer any meaningful
redress for victims. Taken together, these
amount to signiﬁcant failures by the UK
government to uphold its commitments, as
set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and related international trea-
ties and conventions.
British collusion in torture:
limiting transparency and
accountability
At least 119 prisoners were held in CIA
secret prisons as part of the RDI programme
between 2001 and 2008. They were held
incommunicado for months or years on end
and subjected to torture and CIDT. The
extent of the torture was documented in dis-
tressing detail in December 2014 with the
publication of the heavily redacted 499-page
executive summary of the US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence study into CIA
prisoner abuse (hereafter SSCI report).3
The torture was sustained and brutal, and
included: conﬁnement in cofﬁn-like boxes for
hours or even days on end; the use of stress
positions for days on end; repeated simu-
lated drowning for hours at a time using a
‘water board’; rectal force feeding which
served no justiﬁable clinical purpose and
therefore constituted rape; and psychological
torture including mock executions, threats of
physical violence and rape of family mem-
bers and the witnessing of the torture of
other prisoners. None of the prisoners were
provided with adequate legal representation
or the opportunity to contest the allegations
against them in an independent and impar-
tial tribunal. The SSCI’s ﬁndings corrobo-
rated the work of litigators, human rights
NGOs, and academics who for years had
assembled compelling evidence of the details
of the torture and the reach of the CIA’s net-
work of secret prisons.
Over the last decade, thanks to mounting
testimony from victims, the sharing of infor-
mation by UK security personnel off the
record, sustained investigation by NGOs and
a handful of journalists and academics, and
litigation in the UK courts and on behalf of
speciﬁc victims, it became increasingly clear
that the UK had colluded in torture. Yet there
is almost no reference to Britain’s role in the
SSCI report. It has been suggested that this is
because, from 2009 onwards, UK government
ofﬁcials made regular representation to the
SSCI to ensure that mentions of the UK were
redacted, although ofﬁcials have denied this.4
Meanwhile, the incoming UK coalition gov-
ernment ﬁnally launched a judge-led inquiry,
the Gibson Inquiry, in 2010, the purpose of
which was to examine whether Britain was
implicated in the improper treatment of detai-
nees. It was closed down before witnesses
were even called, mainly because of the ongo-
ing police investigation into the rendition and
torture of Abdelhakim Belhaj, which meant
that the Inquiry could not proceed until police
investigations were complete. Since there was
no end in sight to those investigations, Gibson
was forced to abandon his investigations.
Leading human rights organisations and liti-
gators boycotted the inquiry because of con-
cerns about transparency. In particular,
victims and their lawyers were to be denied
the right to question intelligence ofﬁcials
about their mistreatment. Nevertheless, Gib-
son did obtain over 20,000 documents from
UK intelligence agencies and government
departments, and issued a report indicating
that those documents provided evidence of
UK complicity in prisoner abuse.5
After the Gibson Inquiry was aborted,
then Prime Minister David Cameron passed
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responsibility for the investigation to the
ISC. Again, considerable constraints were
placed on the scope of the investigation,
with access denied to key intelligence ofﬁ-
cers with knowledge of British involvement.
After delays brought about by under-resour-
cing, and changes of government following
the 2015 and 2017 general elections, the ISC
ﬁnally published its reports in June 2018.
Despite government attempts to hamstring
the investigation, the reports were hard-hit-
ting. The ﬁrst report documents British
involvement in torture in the early years of
the ‘war on terror’, and renders previous UK
governments’ denials of involvement unten-
able. The second report catalogues a series of
failures in government policy and guidance
to UK security services.6
Thanks to the work of the ISC, we now
have overwhelming evidence that British
intelligence services knew about, suggested,
planned, agreed to, or paid for others to con-
duct rendition operations in more than sev-
enty cases, and colluded in the detention
and abuse of prisoners in numerous ways.
The details are harrowing—one MI6 ofﬁcer
was present while a prisoner was transferred
in a cofﬁn-sized box which was sealed and
then loaded onto a truck to a waiting US air-
craft. It has been reported that this prisoner,
codenamed Cuckoo in the ISC report, was
Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who was transferred
by the CIA from Bagram Airbase in Afghani-
stan to Egypt.7 Under torture in Egypt, he
told his interrogators that there were links
between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s
nuclear weapons programme, and that Sad-
dam Hussein was assisting al-Qaeda with
chemical and biological weapons. On his
return to CIA custody he recanted these
claims and said he had fabricated the story
in the hope of making the torture stop. By
then, however, his claims had been cited
in the justiﬁcations for the 2003 invasion
of Iraq.
In hundreds of further cases, UK ofﬁcials
were aware of detainees being severely mis-
treated by their allies, including on at least
thirteen occasions directly witnessing it, and
twenty-ﬁve incidents in which detainees
reported abuse to UK ofﬁcials. While this
was sometimes reported, the ISC found no
evidence that UK personnel ever intervened
directly to prevent the abuse. Indeed, the
ISC concluded that there seemed to be a con-
cern not to upset the US. The ISC found a
further 232 cases ‘where it appears that UK
personnel continued to supply questions or
intelligence to liaison services after they
knew or suspected (or, in our view, should
have suspected) that a detainee had been or
was being mistreated’.
This brief account of UK collusion in tor-
ture and CIDT, and the response of succes-
sive UK governments to allegations,
demonstrates a culture of denial and compla-
cency about the scale of the problem. It also
shows that while successive UK govern-
ments reluctantly agreed to some limited
processes to investigate the extent of British
involvement, behind the scenes ofﬁcials were
going to extraordinary lengths to suppress
the evidence and limit what could be uncov-
ered. These attempts to limit transparency
and accountability mirror government policy
on torture. UK policy is ambiguous and, as
such, while the public narrative is one of
prohibition, the guidance given to UK per-
sonnel gives considerable latitude to govern-
ment ministers and security personnel which
is likely to result in further collusion in
torture and CIDT.
Policy ambiguities and inadequate
guidance and training
The second of the 2018 ISC reports focusses
on the so-called ‘Consolidated Guidance’,8
issued to all security agencies and the mili-
tary from 2010 onwards. The guidance is
intended to assist UK personnel in their
dealings with overseas partners, and to pro-
tect them from personal liability if abuse of
prisoners occurs.
In January 2017 we gave evidence to the
ISC investigation. We encouraged the Com-
mittee to scrutinise the Consolidated Guid-
ance, since we have long argued that it is
little more than a rhetorical, legal and policy
scaffold which enables the UK government
to demonstrate a minimum procedural
adherence to human rights commitments.
The ISC drew much the same conclusion,
arguing that urgent review is needed. A
public consultation has now been launched
by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner
(IPCO) on reform of the guidance, and we
await publication of the Commissioner’s
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ﬁndings. The comments that follow are
reﬂected in the submission we made to the
IPCO consultation in November 2018.
Current UK policy fails to uphold the
absolute prohibition on torture
The ISC described ‘dangerous ambiguities’
in the guidance. This is clearly illustrated by
the confusion among ministers about how
concerns relating to prisoner abuse should
be treated. Ministers were unclear on
whether they could lawfully allow opera-
tions to go ahead where there was a risk that
prisoners would be mistreated. Disturbingly,
when giving evidence, senior ministers,
including Theresa May, Amber Rudd, Boris
Johnson and Philip Hammond, all made ref-
erences to ticking bomb scenarios as poten-
tially justifying operations where torture
might be used.
This confusion is not surprising given that,
in its current form, the guidance instructs that
where there is a serious risk of torture or
CIDT which cannot be mitigated, the case
should be referred to ministers, and where
ofﬁcers know or believe torture will take
place, they must inform ministers. Ministers
are expected to assess the circumstances and
decide whether the operations can proceed.
Although the guidance suggests there is a
‘presumption’ against UK action where a risk
of torture or CIDT remains, it still leaves
scope for ministers to ‘look at the full com-
plexities of the cases and its legality’. This
implies that ministers can and may authorise
actions where there is a serious risk of torture
and CIDT that cannot be mitigated. At no
point does the guidance state that ministers
are prohibited from authorising operations
where there is a serious risk that an individual
being detained or interviewed overseas will
be subjected to torture or CIDT. Instead, it
grants discretion to ministers. The guidance,
therefore, clearly falls short of the absolute
prohibition. Furthermore, by allowing minis-
ters to approve actions even where there is a
‘serious risk’ of torture or CIDT, the guidance
implies that torture or CIDT may serve some
useful or necessary purpose in the gathering
of critical intelligence.
Decades of research has shown that
torture and CIDT do not result in the
acquisition of reliable intelligence, and more
often than not, torture and CIDT have coun-
ter-productive effects.9 The SSCI concluded
that the CIA’s use of so-called ‘enhanced
interrogation techniques’ (EITs) was not an
effective means of acquiring intelligence or
gaining cooperation. The study stated that
the use of EITs was at odds with the CIA’s
own prior conclusions that coercive and
physical violence and psychological interro-
gation techniques result in false answers and
have proven to be ineffective.
The guidance is also weak on establishing
the UK’s position in relation to international
and domestic law. There is just one vague
reference to international law in the Consoli-
dated Guidance and no reference to domes-
tic law. The guidance sets out the UK
government’s policy, but there is no explicit
statement which clariﬁes that torture and
CIDT are prohibited under domestic law,
either with reference to Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights or to its
obligations as a signatory to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment and Punishment.
This renders the guidance unnecessarily
vague and also suggests that adherence to
international law on torture and CIDT is a
policy matter, whereas in fact the prohibition
of torture and CIDT is enshrined in UK law.
The underlying principle behind both the
Consolidated Guidance and the Overseas
Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) policy
is to limit the risk that UK intelligence and
service personnel will face prosecution in
relation to prisoner mistreatment. Any guid-
ance or policy on prisoner mistreatment
should instead be underpinned by the
moral principle that harming other human
beings through torture or CIDT can never
be justiﬁed.
The difference between the two
approaches is subtle but signiﬁcant. If we
begin with the moral principle—that fellow
human beings should not be subjected to tor-
ture or cruelty—then the risk of any UK
intelligence or service personnel facing pros-
ecution is massively reduced. However, if
avoidance of prosecution is our starting prin-
ciple, the guidance that follows tends to
focus on how much personnel can get away
with before they are in breach of moral and
legal obligations. The guidance, therefore, is
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far weaker and less likely to help prevent
the prosecution of UK personnel than if it
began by stating the absolute prohibition of
torture and CIDT contained in Article 5 of
the UDHR and now enshrined in interna-
tional and domestic law.
Assessment of risk is ﬂimsy
A particular weakness of the guidance is that
it fails to explain what is meant by ‘serious
risk’ and offers no advice on how UK intelli-
gence and service personnel go about deter-
mining the level of risk. The guidance
contains an annex that sets out some of the
things that might be unacceptable: incommu-
nicado detention; whether the detainee has
been given the reasons for his arrest; whether
he will be brought before a judge and when
that will occur; whether he can challenge the
lawfulness of his detention; the conditions of
detention; and whether he will receive a fair
trial. In stating that these things ‘might be
unacceptable’, the Annex is inconsistent with
domestic and international law, because it
fails to note that all of these constitute serious
breaches of domestic and international law.
Furthermore, the guidance fails to note that
where such obligations are breached, the risk
of torture and CIDT is increased.
The annex provides the standard legal def-
inition of torture. It then lists a small number
of practices that ‘could constitute cruel, inhu-
man and degrading treatment or punish-
ment’. The guidance would be strengthened
considerably if detailed, actual examples
were provided, drawing on speciﬁc cases
from the SSCI report and elsewhere. This
would provide UK personnel with a clearer
picture of those practices that have been
used by UK allies in recent history, and
which have been clearly established as con-
stituting torture and CIDT by the SSCI and
the ISC, as well as the UN Special Rappor-
teur on Torture, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, and numerous human
rights litigators and NGOs.
The annex fails to explain that certain prac-
tices might be considered ‘only’ as cruel or
inhuman when used in isolation, but if they
are used repeatedly, systematically, and
alongside other cruel or inhuman practices,
the perpetrators are establishing a regime of
torture for the prisoner. The guidance needs
to be more explicit that rarely do those perpe-
trating cruelty do so on a one-off basis. There-
fore, if there is any evidence of a single
incident of cruel treatment, UK intelligence
and service personnel should assume that the
incident was not isolated. Again, the detailed
accounts of the range of cruel practices to
which CIA prisoners were subjected provides
solid evidence to support this argument.
To strengthen the annex, therefore, greater
clarity is needed to illustrate that where
international legal standards for arrest and
detention are not met, the risk of torture and
CIDT is also increased. The annex should
offer a detailed risk assessment matrix which
includes a list of indicators that would sug-
gest a prisoner may be being abused. Guid-
ance should be sought from advocates and
legal representatives with experience of
working with torture victims to help develop
a robust risk assessment tool.
Assurances from overseas partners
cannot be relied on
The ISC report demonstrates that there is con-
siderable reliance on seeking assurances from
overseas partners that prisoners will not be
abused. Several concerns arise. First, the
assurances are not a pre-requisite, according
to the guidance, and operations can still go
ahead even if assurances cannot be obtained.
Second, assurances can be provided orally
rather than in writing, with very obvious
scope for confusion and malfeasance. Relat-
edly, the UK intelligence and security agen-
cies have no real mechanism for following up
on those assurances to ensure they are
enforced. The ISC stated, ‘Whether assurances
were adhered to is not routinely tracked and
we were told [by SIS] that it was not seen as
the best use of resources to do so’. Finally,
record keeping on the securing of assurances
was poor. Furthermore, human rights investi-
gators have long argued that assurances are
inherently unreliable and fail to mitigate the
risk of torture and CIDT.10
The scope of the guidance needs to be
broadened
Operations conducted in collaboration with a
range of external partners, including non-
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state actors, failed states, and joint unit oper-
ations with third party states, fall outside the
scope of the guidance. This means that, in
theory, prisoner abuse could be outsourced
to external partners. Yet the outsourcing of
torture and CIDT is a mechanism which the
ISC found was used extensively between
2001–2010 to hide the UK’s role in abuse.
Similarly, key aspects of the CIA’s RDI
programme, including the design and imple-
mentation of the so-called ‘enhanced interro-
gation techniques’ were largely outsourced
to two private contractors, psychologists
James Mitchell and John ‘Bruce’ Jessen, who
oversaw the torture and CIDT. The guidance
must, therefore, apply to non-state actors,
especially as liaison services increasingly
contract private actors, precisely to shield
themselves from scrutiny.
In its evidence to the ISC, SIS [MI6]
insisted that it ‘cannot be responsible for
operations carried out by a foreign service
unit independently of SIS direction’. The ISC
discussed the case of Michael Adebolajo with
SIS. He had been arrested in Kenya in rela-
tion to the murder of Lee Rigby and was
interviewed by the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism
Police Unit (ATPU) and a Kenyan counter-
terrorism unit (ARCTIC) which had a close
relationship with the UK government. Ade-
bolajo alleged he was mistreated. SIS insisted
that the Consolidated Guidance did not
apply in this case, since it had not been
involved in Adebolajo’s arrest, did not inter-
view him, was not involved in his passage
and did not receive intelligence relating to
him. ISC took a contrary view—that because
SIS part-funded and part-tasked ARCTIC,
SIS’s responsibilities were engaged when
ACTIC interviewed him.
The case provides a clear example of the
limitations of the guidance, and the potential
for UK agencies to circumvent it, absolv-
ing themselves of responsibility in cases
where their overseas partners torture and
abuse prisoners.
Rendition should be categorised as a
form of CIDT
The ISC found that the UK government has
no clear policy on rendition. In R v Mullen
the Court of Appeal ruled in February 1999
that the facilitation by MI6 of the transfer of
Nicholas Mullen from Zimbabwe to the UK
to stand trial on charges related to Irish
republican terrorism represented an extre-
mely serious failure to adhere to the rule of
law and involved a clear abuse of process.
This case provides the basis for the UK’s
legal position on rendition, and the UK has
not itself sought to conduct such renditions
to the UK since then.
However, there is insufﬁcient clarity on
what the UK government’s position is on
enabling or supporting others to conduct a
rendition, and what the circumstances would
be in which it would consider this accept-
able. This led the ISC to conclude that the
government ‘has failed to introduce any pol-
icy or process that will ensure that allies will
not use UK territory for rendition purposes
without prior permission’. Furthermore,
although the Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofﬁce supposedly has government oversight,
it has failed to review policy regularly and
was unable to provide to the ISC a compre-
hensive picture of its areas of responsibility.
In any instance where UK personnel would
consider condoning a rendition operation by
overseas partners, a full risk assessment must
be undertaken. Where such a risk assessment
concludes that there is a risk of torture or
CIDT, the operation should not be condoned
or supported and UK personnel should not in
any way engage. Rendition operations clearly
carry very high risks of torture and CIDT,
based on the evidence of how such operations
have been conducted previously.
The government has resisted including
rendition as a form of CIDT in the guidance,
arguing that the absence of a clear deﬁnition
is grounds for its exclusion. This is unaccept-
able, not least because there is excellent aca-
demic work that provides clarity on the
violations of human rights that rendition
operations have entailed, including: kidnap,
often involving stripping naked, sensory
deprivation, and forced administration of
drugs orally and rectally; incommunicado
detention; and denial of due process.11
Denying the right to redress
Article 8 of the UDHR states that ‘Everyone
has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violat-
ing the fundamental rights granted by the
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constitution or by law’. This protection is
also contained in various international
human rights treaties, the Human Rights Act
1998 and has long been a part of the UK
domestic law. Despite this fundamental legal
protection, there has been a reluctance by
the UK government fully to investigate cred-
ible evidence of complicity in torture and
CIDR and little has been done to offer mean-
ingful redress.
The Intelligence Services Commissioner
released information in December 2017 that
indicated that GCHQ had wrongly applied
the Consolidated Guidance in thirty-ﬁve
cases. In eight of those, had the guidance
been properly adhered to, the sharing of
information would have been prohibited. It
is not clear what the reasons were, but it is
reasonable to assume this was because there
was a ‘serious risk’ of torture or CIDT.12 No
data has been shared on potential breaches
by the SIS or the Security Service (SyS).
It is highly likely, therefore, that individu-
als who were the subject of such information
sharing were subjected to torture or CIDT.
They have the right to remedy, but there are
no procedures in place that require the rele-
vant parties to notify them of the breach, or
to inform them that any violations of their
rights resulted from UK action. There are
strong grounds for regular review of compli-
ance by the various agencies with the
Consolidated Guidance, and of ministerial
authorisations granted. If failings in apply-
ing the Consolidated Guidance are identi-
ﬁed, subjects should be notiﬁed of the
intelligence sharing.
There has been a tendency for the UK gov-
ernment to try and block the release of infor-
mation pertaining to UK involvement in the
unlawful treatment of prisoners overseas, and
to prevent litigation on their behalf. In some
cases, the government has attempted to with-
hold the publication of key documents in
open court, such as those which demonstrate
that British intelligence knew about the tor-
ture of prisoners by the CIA before participat-
ing directly in their interrogation. Where UK
courts have refused to accept government
attempts to hold hearings in camera, such
as in the case brought by ﬁve former
Guantanamo Bay prisoners alleging British
involvement in their unlawful imprisonment
and treatment, the government has offered
substantial payouts without any admission of
liability on behalf of the British authorities.
The passage of the Justice and Security Act
in April 2013, with its introduction of so-
called ‘closed material procedures’ into the
main civil courts, was motivated largely by a
desire to embed in law the executive’s ability
to keep details regarding UK involvement in
torture from reaching the public record. Simi-
larly, in the case of the rendition of Abdel
Hakim Belhadj and Fatima Boudchar to
Libya, the UK government argued that either
the foreign act of state doctrine or the doctrine
of state immunity barred the courts from
hearing the case. This was despite clear and
unambiguous evidence of SIS’s role in their
rendition to Libya, revealed when secret
memos exchanged between SIS and the Head
of Libyan intelligence were discovered after
the fall of Colonel Ghaddaﬁ in 2011.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in
an interim report to mark the seventieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, re-stated the case for robust
mechanisms for remedy when torture and
CIDT take place:
Effective and independent complaints and
investigation mechanisms, including prosecu-
torial and judicial authorities able to adjudi-
cate violations and prosecute and punish
perpetrators, are vital. In practice, non-judi-
cial complaints mechanisms often are the
weakest link in the institutional framework.13
The UK must allow for much greater trans-
parency when UK ofﬁcials fail in their duties
to prevent torture and CIDT, and the culture
of obstructing appropriate remedy for vic-
tims must end.
Conclusion
The ISC has provided detailed evidence that
UK personnel were complicit in torture and
CIDT, as well as in the incommunicado
detention of a number of prisoners, as part
of the CIA’s RDI programme. Despite prior
reckonings with their torturous past, includ-
ing the CIA concluding in the latter years of
the Cold War that torture was neither useful
or effective, and the then British Prime Min-
ister Ted Heath outlawing it in response to
the use of the so-called ‘ﬁve techniques’ in
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Northern Ireland in 1972, both the US and
UK have reneged on these commitments to a
disturbing degree.
Current UK policy on torture, and the pur-
suant guidance it issues to UK intelligence
and security personnel, is wholly insufﬁcient
in deterring collusion in torture. A much more
robust policy is needed. There are compelling
grounds for legislation which enshrines into
law the prohibition of any action by any
member of any UK government agency where
torture and CIDT are a risk. The case against
torture and CIDT as useful or necessary for
the acquisition of intelligence has long been
proven, and it is time that all UK agencies
were adequately constrained by law to
uphold the prohibition against torture and
CIDT without exception. The fact that numer-
ous government ministers were seduced by
fallacious claims that torture is effective
should give all parliamentarians and mem-
bers of the public pause for thought.
The facts of UK collusion in torture and
CIDT paint a very dark picture for a country
that prides itself on its liberal democratic
values. UK hypocrisy has been laid bare,
and through foolish and needless acts, suc-
cessive UK governments have eroded any
legitimacy the UK had in holding other
states to account for human rights violations.
Only a proper reckoning for wrongdoing
will begin to undo the damage. This means
taking seriously UK obligations to imple-
ment proper and effective remedy, including
through prosecution of those individuals
who colluded in torture and CIDT.
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